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Abstract: The main objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of non-informative communications on 
asset prices. An experimental approach allows us to control for the release of non-relevant messages. We 
introduce the release of messages in standard experimental asset markets with bubbles (Smith, Suchanek and 
Williams 1988) through a strategy method experiment. We conjecture that a priori uninformative messages 
can significantly impact the level of asset prices. Uninformative communications may be used by boundedly 
rational subjects to compute the fundamental value of the asset. In addition, rational agents may anticipate 
such an effect and adapt their strategy to the messages received. We asked 182 subjects to construct 
strategies about their action in a standard experimental asset market environment. Our analysis sheds light on 
the possibility of manipulation and stabilization of financial markets by influential agents such as financial 
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"…how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, 
which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in 
Japan over the past decade?" (Alan Greenspan, black-tie dinner speech: "The 
Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society" before the American 
Enterprise Institute at the Washington Hilton Hotel December 5, 1996) 
 
1.  Introduction: why words matter?  
 
As pointed out by Sperber (2005), obscurity of expression is considered as a language 
and communication imperfection, except in a maîtres à penser or guru's speech. 
Greenspan's seemingly harmless quotation implied a strong reaction in the markets. The 
Tokyo stock market that opened at the time of his speech, felt sharply, and closed down 
3%. Similarly, stock markets in Frankfurt and London felt by 4%. The US stock market 
felt 2% immediately after its opening (Shiller, 2001). Although the term "irrational 
exuberance" reached a definition status and is now used as a synonym for a heightened 
state of speculative fervour, it seems disproportionate that markets react all over the 
world to a question casually thrown out in the middle of a dinner speech (Shiller, 2001). 
Defenders of full rationality may argue that Greenspan’s speech had an informative 
content since it leads traders to revise upwards the probability of an increase in US 
interest rates. Experimental markets allow us to disentangle the effects of informative 
and uninformative messages on asset prices since then we can control for the level of 
informativeness of messages. Under the full rationality hypothesis, an uninformative 
communication should not have any impact on asset prices. However, if we consider 
one of the following situations: i) traders are boundedly rational or ii) rationality is not 
common knowledge, uninformative messages are likely to influence prices. First, 
uninformative communications may be used by boundedly rational subjects to compute 
the fundamental value of the asset. Second, rational agents that do not believe in others’ 
full rationality may anticipate such an effect and adapt their strategy to the messages 
received. 
As a result, we have to stress that messages that are uninformative under the common 
knowledge of rationality assumption may appear to be informative if traders are not 
fully rational.  
We therefore address in this paper the question of the sensitiveness of financial market 
prices to uninformative communications. We build our analysis within a cold 
experimental financial market, i.e. we construct a strategy method experiment (Selten, 
1967). Assessing the importance of communications on financial markets prices using 
real markets data is rendered impossible by the multiplicity and simultaneity of the 
messages reaching the market. This is why we consider an experimental approach 
allowing us to control for the release of non-relevant messages. We introduce the 
possibility of communications in standard experimental asset markets with bubbles 
described in Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988). We consider the case in which a 
message about the price of the experimental asset is sent at the end of a trading period. 
We decide to use a strategy method experiment in the spirit of Selten, Mitzkewitz and 
Uhlich (1997), or Sonnemans et al.(2004). In a strategy method experiment, subjects are 
asked to formulate a complete strategy, which is a description of their decisions in all 
possible states of the world. Decisions in this type of experiment are not immediate; 
subjects have time to construct their decisions and to "look forward" for their   2 
implications. In hot experiments, subjects make relatively few decisions in a short 
period of time. It is then difficult to detect the type of beliefs taken into account by 
traders when making their decisions.  
Our decision has been to test our main hypothesis that uninformative messages 
influence asset prices in a context a priori unfavorable. Indeed, in a strategy method 
experiment, as subjects have more time to make decisions, they are less likely to exhibit 
boundedly rational behaviors. As a result, the non-relevant message delivered on the 
market should not modify subjects’ beliefs about the fundamental value of the asset. In 
addition, compared to a hot experiment, traders should anticipate that everybody has 
more time to make decisions so that the common knowledge of rationality hypothesis is 
more likely to hold. In summary, in a strategy method experiment, asset prices should 
be less sensitive to uninformative messages than in a hot experiment. Therefore, the 
strategy method experiment will be our stress treatment. If prices are influenced by 
messages in that context, this will provide a strong support for our research hypothesis. 
Our research hypothesis is stated below jointly with four complementary hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis: A priori uninformative messages have a significant impact on asset prices.  
 
The argument is that messages can serve as a focal point for the convergence of beliefs 
among subjects. If we agree that experimental bubbles occur partly as a result of a 
divergence in traders’ beliefs (as argued for example in Smith, Suchanek and Williams, 
1988), the introduction of messages in the experimental design should significantly 
reduce bubbles by facilitating the coordination of beliefs. We test our main hypothesis 
by using the experimental design presented in the next section. Our contribution can 
help analyze the extent to which asset markets can be manipulated by influential agents 






Hypothesis a: The effect of uninformative messages on asset prices is higher in the case 
of hard signals than in the case of soft signals (Content dimension).  
 
A recent strand of literature proposes to distinguish hard versus soft information 
(Petersen, 2004). Hard information is quantitative, verifiable and explicit. Soft 
information is qualitative, non verifiable and implicit. It is strongly contingent on 
cognitive factors and subjective judgments. This distinction has been recently used as an 
alternative explanation of risk decision of financial intermediaries (Stein, 2002). 
However, evidence that the type of information impacts financial markets prices 
remains scarce. In this paper we set up an experimental environment in which subjects 
have full information (they may not use it fully rationally but they are perfectly 
informed) so that any messages that we are releasing are a priori uninformative. As a 
result, we will refer to hard / soft messages or communications rather than to hard / soft 
information. The difference between hard and soft messages can be seen as a way to 
distinguish messages according to their content. We argue (Hypothesis a) that hard 
messages, compared to soft messages, are likely to facilitate the coordination of beliefs 
among traders implying that such messages have a greater influence on asset prices. 
This should be the case since the interpretation of such messages is more homogenous. 
Indeed, traders may not agree on a unique interpretation of soft messages.   3 
Kirschenheiter (2002) proposes the following distinction between hard and soft 
information:  “Hard information (…) is when everyone agrees on its meaning. (…) 
Honest disagreements arise when two people perfectly observe information yet interpret 
this information differently (i.e. soft information)”. 
 
Hypothesis b: The effect of uninformative messages on asset prices is higher the higher 
is the reliability of the message sender (Reliability dimension). 
 
Reasons to hear a message released in the market and to accept to interpret it (the first 
two steps by which the power of words can be characterized) may be internal (related to 
its content) or external (related to its source) (Sperber, 2005). In this paper we show 
how messages and communications are relevant in financial markets, and this can be a 
rational way to achieve coordination and stabilization. The relevance (in our case 
closely related to the reliability of the sender) of a message is an indicator of its 
‘power’.
1 The power of a message depends on the tradeoff between the informational 
gains associated with processing the message and the processing effort. As a result, 
deliberately opaque and short formulations, released by authorial sources (maîtres à 
faire), replacing complicated statements, can have a significant influence of individuals’ 
behavior (Sperber, 2005). Reliability facilitates information processing since then 
traders do not have to fully examine the steps and reasons underlying the official 
statement.  
 
Hypothesis c: The effect of uninformative messages on asset prices is higher the more 
frequently messages are released (Frequency dimension). 
 
As emphasized by Mullainathan (2002), one can understand individuals’ bounded 
rationality by memory limitations. As a result, mechanisms facilitating the work of 
memory should help boundedly rational traders to compute the fundamental value of the 
experimental asset. The frequency with which the message is released is then expected 
to affect the valuation of the asset by non-fully rational traders. 
 
Hypothesis d: As traders’ experience increases the effect of uninformative messages on 
asset prices decreases. (Experience dimension) 
 
There is another question that may be of interest: the difference between market 
manipulation and market stabilization. Are uninformative messages more effective in 
stabilizing the market (avoiding bubbles in our experimental design) than in 
destabilizing the market (exacerbating bubbles)? A priori, we may think that 
stabilization of the market is easier since a rational equilibrium to which subjects may 
coordinate their expectations exists there. 
 
The introduction of communication is not the first mechanism considered in order to 
reduce the magnitude of experimental bubbles. Experience of subjects (King et al., 
1992, Dufwenberg, Lindqvist and Moore, 2005) and the introduction of future markets 
(Porter and Smith, 1994) in the experimental design have been found to be particularly 
effective to limit the occurrence of experimental bubbles. However, the solution 
proposed here is particularly attractive since much less costly than the introduction of a 
new institution like a future market and much faster than training subjects.    
                                                 
1 Market circumstances may influence the relevance and the power of the message. A message is likely to 
be highly relevant in a period of bubble or crash.    4 
  
2.  Experimental methods: an asset market strategy experiment  
 
2.1. Experimental treatments  
 
We propose to use the design presented by Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) while 
considering the parameter values used in Dufwenberg, Lindqvist and Moore (2005).
2 In 
these experimental asset markets, a unique asset is traded. The asset releases a dividend 
at the beginning of each of the 15 or 30 trading periods. The dividend is drawn from a 
probability distribution known by experimental traders. Subjects are given an 
endowment in cash and assets at the beginning of the experiment. The market is not 
“reinitialized” at the beginning of each period, so that trading periods only differ in the 
realization of the dividend process. The trading procedure is a computerized double-
auction mechanism. Subjects are trading continuously the experimental asset by 
entering bid and ask prices on a computer screen. A unit of the asset is traded once an 
ask or bid price previously entered is accepted by a subject. 
The experimental markets are usually characterized by a “boom” phase (a period where 
prices are higher than the fundamental value of the asset) followed by a “crash” period.
3 
This is a surprising result, since according to backward induction, risk neutral agents 
should trade at the fundamental value.
4  
 
There are two differences between our design and the the design used by Smith, 
Suchanek and Williams (1988). First of all, our experiment is a strategy method 
experiment (cold experiment), i.e. participants have to propose actions for all the 
periods and the states of the world and to justify their choices. Their strategies are then 
programmed and simulated and they are paid according to the relative performance of 
their strategy. The second difference is that we allow for the release of messages along 
the experiment. We characterize messages using three dimensions:  
 
1.  reliability of the sender,  
2.  content of the message,  
3.  frequency of the message.  
 
We believe that these three dimensions may influence experimental asset prices. 
Reliability of the person sending the message will influence the degree to which the 
message is “focal” to the agent (the agent is sensitive to the reception of the message). 
Reliability  is maximal when subjects know that the message is delivered by the 
experimenter. In Table 1, we propose different alternatives in which the reliability of the 
sender is likely to be lower, as for example the case of a student sending the message, or 
as in the case of a random message. We denote B(i,j,k) a treatment in which the 
message has reliability i, content j and frequency k, where i,j,k  can be low (L) or 
high(H).The content of the message is as well important, a vague statement (“the 
average price is too low or too high”) as described in treatment B(L,L,H) may have a 
more reduced impact on subjects’ beliefs than a precise statement like: “the average 
price is x cents of euro too low or x cents of euro too high” (see treatment B(L,H,H) 
                                                 
2 The authors consider 6 subjects trading for 10 periods. We propose to use similar endowment classes as 
well.  
3 The fundamental value of the asset is computed as the expected value of future dividends delivered by 
the asset. 
4 Risk averse agents should trade at a price lower than the fundamental value.  
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and B(H,H,H)). Finally, the frequency of the messages is an important variable, we 
believe that the more frequent is a message, the higher is its impact on traders’ beliefs 
and then on experimental prices.    
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We considered the 4 treatments specified in Table 1. Evidently, several other 
configurations for i,j,k can be considered: different types of message, we can modify the 
frequency of the message or release a random message. 
We conjecture that the impact of messages on experimental asset prices will be higher 
the higher the reliability of the sender, the more precise is the signal and the more 
frequent are the messages. We consider for the moment only the configuration in which 
the message is very frequent (k=H). We expect to observe some effects of the messages 
in treatments B(L,L,H),    B(H,L,H)  and  B(L,H,H) and more perceptible effects in 
treatment B(H,H,H). We also run a benchmark treatment in which no messages are 
delivered, as in Dufwenberg, Lindqvist and Moore (2005). Our treatments are 
summarized in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Summary of the experimental design 
 
Treatment 0  - No messages are delivered. 




- Messages are delivered at the end of periods 5 to 9. 
The content of the message is either precise or vague, and the 
reliability of the sender of the message is either high or low.  
 
 
Our experimental design allows us to assess how influential agents can impact the level 
of prices in financial markets. If we find no effects for the treatments B(i,j,k) presented 
in Table 1, we can conclude that the impact of financial “gurus” on the market is   6 
limited (through their influence on media). If message treatments have a significant 
impact on experimental prices we may conclude that manipulation of prices by financial 
“gurus” is possible and relatively easy: we can conclude that stabilization of prices can 
be obtained by announcements delivered by financial authorities.
5 
 
2.2. Subjects and procedures  
 
This experiment has been conducted in November 2005 at the Burgundy School of 
Business in Dijon, France. Altogether 182 students were recruited on a voluntary basis 
in an introduction to Psychology undergraduate course in which there are 272 students 
aged between 19 and 22. Students in this course usually have an intensive 2 years post-
secondary background, and pass an entrance exam to join the school. Subjects received 
instructions with full information about the market and procedures and had one week to 
submit their strategies and comments. Up to 50 subjects participated in each of the five 
treatments corresponding to treatments 0 and B(i,j,k).  They were asked not to 
communicate about the experiment during the week and asked to describe their 
strategies and motivations as accurately as possible.  
Subjects were involved in trading an asset with a finite life of ten periods. In each 
period the asset pay a dividend of 0 or 20 cents, with equal probability. Therefore the 
expected monetary benefit of holding an asset is 10 cents for each remaining period. 
They were told that each market will involve 6 traders, who could buy and sell assets. 
Half of the subjects (3) started with a cash endowment of 200 cents and six assets and 
the other half (3) with a cash endowment of 600 cents and 2 assets. A trader's cash 
holding at any point in time differed from his or her cash endowment by accumulated 
capital gains or losses via market trading, and accumulated dividend earnings via asset 
units held in inventory at the end of each trading period. All information was common 
knowledge. 
Assuming risk neutrality and zero time preference, the fundamental value of the asset, 
by backward induction, is equal to 10t where t is the number of remaining periods. 
Subjects had to describe their trading actions and to anticipate the market price for the 
10 trading periods. Several simulation schemes were than implemented on each 
strategy, by incorporating it in homogenous or heterogeneous 6 traders markets, as we 
explain in the next section. Subjects were paid on the basis of the results of one 
randomly selected strategy. The earnings in points were ranked, the best strategy was 




In this section, we use the data of our strategy experiments in order to test the 
hypotheses stated in the introduction. We provide statistical tests to assess how 
uninformative messages do affect expected asset prices, bids, asks and simulated asset 
prices. 
 
3.1 Analysis of expected prices: ‘when words really matter’ 
 
3.1.1 Break tests on expected asset prices 
 
We are interested in knowing if there exists a shift in prices expectations in period 5 
when messages start to be delivered. We test for a shift in expected prices using panel 
                                                 
5 Interventions of Alan Greenspan are examples of such attempts to stabilize asset prices.   7 
data regression methods. We run the following regression for the different treatments 
considered in our strategy experiments (i.e. B(H,H,H), B(L,H,H), B(L,L,H), B(H,L,H), 
and treatment 0):  
 
f(t) = c(0) + c(1)*t 
 
where  f(t) is the price forecast for period t and c(0) or c(1) are the regression 
coefficients. 
  
We compare the trend coefficient c(1) for 1<t<4 and for 5<t<10. 
We display in the appendix the output for the panel data regression on the full sample 
(1<t<10) and the test for the stability of the coefficient c(1). We first observe that, in the 
full sample, c(1) is highly significant for the different treatments. This means that agents 
are correctly assessing the decreasing patterns of fundamental values. We then test for 
the stability of the trend parameter by running a Wald-test where the null hypothesis is 
that the coefficient c(1) is the same in the two subsamples (the subsample without 
messages: 1<t<4 and the subsample with messages: 5<t<10). We are unable to reject 
the stability of the trend coefficient in treatment 0, whereas we strongly reject 
coefficient stability in treatment HHH. This finding is consistent with an alternative 
version of our main hypothesis stating that the release of uninformative messages has an 
impact on expected prices. This effect is observed at a lesser extent for treatment LLH.  
 
Result 1: The release of uninformative messages significantly influence expected 
asset prices in treatments HHH and LLH. 
 
According to Result 1, our subjects anticipate that uninformative messages released at 
the end of the fifth period are going to affect asset prices. The break observed in asset 
prices is stronger for treatment HHH in agreement with the assumption. As a result, 
even in a strategy method experiment for which individuals’ bounded rationality is 
limited, uninformative communication may affect prices. This occurs even in treatment 
LLH, where the sender has low reliability and the uninformative message is imprecise. 
However, we are unable to find such message effects in treatments LHH and HLH. In 
figure 1, we draw the average expected prices for each period and treatments O, HHH 
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Result 1’: The impact of uninformative messages on expected asset prices is 
strongest when the message sender is highly reliable and the message is very 
precise. 
 
According to the stability test provided in the appendix, the existence of a break is more 
significant in the case of treatment HHH since there we can reject the stability of the 
trend coefficient at a 1% level of significance. The stability of the coefficient c(1) is not 
rejected at this level of significance in any of the treatments LLH, LHH and HLH. 
Result 1’ implies that our complementary assumptions on the role of the reliability of 
the message sender and on the content of the message are only partially verified. We 
cannot conclude that the reliability of the message sender or the content of the message 
alone explain the effect of uninformative messages on expected asset prices. Indeed, 
treatments HLH and LHH, which are characterized by a more reliable message and 
more precise content of the message respectively than treatment LLH lead to a much 
lower effect of uninformative messages on expected asset prices. 
 
3.1.2 Bubbles and expected asset prices: ‘don’t play with words’ 
 
 In the next figure, we represent the average expected bubble for each of the ten periods 
of the experiment and for each of the treatments.  
 
Result 2: Our messages treatments are associated with large bubbles in asset 
prices.  
 
We observe that asset prices are higher than the fundamentals for any of the messages 
treatments considered whereas no bubbles are observed in the absence of messages 
(treatment 0). This result may seem surprising if we take into account that our message 
stresses that the prices observed in the market are too high. Our initial objective has 
been to stabilize prices in the market by warning traders that they may overvalue the 
experimental asset. However, our message seems to have the opposite effect on asset 
prices since then bubbles appear in the market. As we have stressed in the introduction, 
bubbles can arise either because subjects are not rational or because they do not believe   9 
in others’ rationality. As a result, our messages may positively influence the formation 
of bubbles by making agents aware of the possibility that others are irrational. Indeed, 
our message mentions explicitly the possibility of a bubble from period 5 onwards. In 
agreement with this hypothesis, volatility in asst prices tends to increase as messages 
reach the experimental markets (see appendix). If messages would serve to stabilize 
market prices by making traders’ beliefs homogenous we would expect asset prices 
volatility to decrease with the release of messages. Given that non-rational behaviors are 
complex messages may not always have the expected effects. This implies that one may 
destabilize the market by attempting to stabilize it. Our second result provides support 
for avoiding possible interventions of financial authorities that attempt to regulate the 
market. In addition, special attention should be given to the possibility of destabilization 
of asset markets by influential ‘gurus’. Such communications should be reduced as 
much as possible. As a consequence of results 1 and 2, asset prices do react to 
uninformative communications but in a direction that is difficult to predict. 
 




















Result 2’: The more reliable and the more precise is the message released from 
period 5 onwards, the larger is the expected bubble in prices. 
 
We can observe that expected asset bubbles are stronger in treatments HHH and HLH 
than in treatments LLH and LHH suggesting that the reliability of the message sender 
positively impacts the magnitude of expected bubbles. Similarly, bubbles are expected 
to be higher in treatment HHH (LHH) than in treatment HLH (LLH) so that the 
precision of the message sent from period 5 onwards seems to increase expected asset 
prices bubbles. 
 
We evaluate the goodness-of-fit between the estimated and fundamental values using 
the Haessel-R² statistic; this statistic takes values between 0 and 1 (1 is a perfect fit) and 
its average, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values are reported in table 3 
for treatments B(H,H,H), B(L,L,H) and 0. The more prices conform to the fundamental 
value, the more the statistic approaches 1. 
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Table 3: Goodness-of-fit for treatments B(H,H,H), B(L,L,H) and 0 
 
B(H,H,H) B(L,L,H)  0   
bid ask estimated 
price 
bid ask estimated 
price 
Bid ask estimated 
price 
average  0.76 0.77 0.61  0.86 0.88 0.71  0.28 0.33 1.00 
SD  0.33 0.25 0.40  0.25 0.20 0.40  0.48 0.38 0.00 
min  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.20 0.00  0.00 0.00 1.00 
max  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 0.90 1.00 
 
 
4. Conclusions (partial) 
 
Results 1 and 1’ suggest that asset prices strongly react to uninformative 
communications even if the reliability of the message sender is low or the statement is 
imprecise. However, it appears very difficult to predict the direction in which prices are 
going to be affected by messages (Result 2). 
 
5. Appendix  
 
5.1. Panel data regressions for the different treatments 
- Treatment O 
Dependent Variable: Expected asset prices 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Sample: 1 10 
Included observations: 10 
Number of cross-sections used: 4 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 40 
Cross sections without valid observations dropped 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
C 100.00  9.22E-15  1.08E+16  0.00 
@TREND -10.000  1.73E-15 -5.79E+15  0.00 
R-squared  1.000000      Mean dependent var  55.00000 
Adjusted R-squared  1.000000      S.D. dependent var  29.08872 
S.E. of regression  3.14E-14      Sum squared resid  3.74E-26 
Log likelihood  1187.970      F-statistic  3.35E+31 
Durbin-Watson stat  0.082038      Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000 
- Treatment HHH 
Dependent Variable: Expected asset prices 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Sample: 1 10 
Included observations: 10 
Number of cross-sections used: 19 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 190 
Cross sections without valid observations dropped 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
C  108.3633  3.597931 30.11821 0.0000 
@TREND -6.047624  0.673954  -8.973344  0.0000 
R-squared  0.299868      Mean dependent var  81.14895 
Adjusted R-squared  0.296144      S.D. dependent var  31.80478 
S.E. of regression  26.68297      Sum squared resid  133852.4 
F-statistic  80.52091      Durbin-Watson stat  0.077123 
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- Treatment LLH 
Dependent Variable: Expected asset prices 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Sample: 1 10 
Included observations: 10 
Number of cross-sections used: 30 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 300 
Cross sections without valid observations dropped 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
C  104.5351  2.579182 40.53035 0.0000 
@TREND -8.601166  0.483125  -17.80319  0.0000 
R-squared  0.515411      Mean dependent var  65.82990 
Adjusted R-squared  0.513784      S.D. dependent var  34.46932 
S.E. of regression  24.03517      Sum squared resid  172151.4 
F-statistic  316.9535      Durbin-Watson stat  0.099089 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000     
- Treatment LHH 
Dependent Variable: Expected asset prices 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Date: 03/13/06   Time: 19:51 
Sample: 5 10 
Included observations: 6 
Number of cross-sections used: 19 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 114 
Cross sections without valid observations dropped 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
C  105.1673  11.19614 9.393178 0.0000 
@TREND -7.954887  1.665939  -4.775017  0.0000 
R-squared  0.169144      Mean dependent var  53.46053 
Adjusted R-squared  0.161726      S.D. dependent var  33.17890 
S.E. of regression  30.37770      Sum squared resid  103354.1 
F-statistic  22.80079      Durbin-Watson stat  0.027815 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000005     
- Treatment HLH 
Dependent Variable: Expected asset prices 
Method: Pooled Least Squares 
Date: 03/13/06   Time: 19:58 
Sample: 1901 1910 
Included observations: 10 
Number of cross-sections used: 22 
Total panel (balanced) observations: 220 
Cross sections without valid observations dropped 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
C  107.7893  5.180095 20.80835 0.0000 
@TREND -7.634986  0.970321  -7.868518  0.0000 
R-squared  0.221188      Mean dependent var  73.43182 
Adjusted R-squared  0.217616      S.D. dependent var  46.73514 
S.E. of regression  41.33840      Sum squared resid  372532.2 
F-statistic  61.91357      Durbin-Watson stat  0.125888 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000     
 
5.2. Stability tests  
 
- Treatment HHH 
 
We test (Wald coefficient test) if C(2) - the coefficient of the trend is stable- To do so 
we test if the trend coefficient in the regression for periods 5 to 10 is equal to –2.38. 
Here is the result: 
Wald Test: 
Equation: POOLALL 
Null Hypothesis:  C(2)=-2.38 
F-statistic 8.842090    Probability  0.003605 
Chi-square 8.842090    Probability 0.002944   12  
We have to REJECT the absence of breaks. This implies that estimated prices are not 
stable. There is a break in period 5 (we would obtain similar result for a break in period 
6). 
    
- Treatment LLH 
Wald Test: 
Equation: POOALL 
Null Hypothesis:  C(2)=-6.41 
F-statistic 3.860354    Probability  0.050996 
Chi-square 3.860354    Probability 0.049440 
 
We CANNOT REJECT the absence of breaks at a 5% level of significance. However at 
a 10% level we REJECT the absence of a break at t=5. This implies that estimated 
prices are more stable than under treatment HHH (what we should expect). However, 
there is evidence of a break in period 5 (we would obtain similar result for a break in 
period 6). 
 
- Treatment LHH 
Wald Test: 
Equation: POOLALL 
Null Hypothesis:  C(2)=-7.07 
F-statistic 0.282135    Probability  0.596357 
Chi-square 0.282135    Probability 0.595305 
 
- Treatment HLH 
Wald Test: 
Equation: POOLALL 
Null Hypothesis:  C(2)=-6.54 
F-statistic 0.547079    Probability  0.460847 
Chi-square 0.547079    Probability 0.459514 
 
5.3. Volatility of expected asset prices 
 
We draw the evolution of the standardized volatility of expected asset prices from the 
first to the tenth period of our strategy experiment. The standardized volatility for 
treatment T and period t is computed as the standard deviation for expected prices for 
treatment T and period t divided by the fundamental value of the asset in that period.  
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5.4. Instructions: as an example, these are the instructions for one of the 
participants in treatment HHH (in French) 
 
Ce jeu consiste en une expérience sur la prise de décision. Les instructions sont simples, 
si vous les suivez et si vous prenez les bonnes décisions, vous pouvez gagner un nombre 
de points considérable.  L'expérience consiste en une série de périodes dans lesquelles 
vous avez l'opportunité d'acheter ou de vendre dans un marché. Toutes les opérations 
d'achat ou vente se font en points.  
Je vous prie de ne pas communiquer entre vous sur ce jeu avant la remise de vos 
stratégies. Normalement vous devriez pouvoir construire une stratégie complète à ce jeu 
en 2 heures. Je vous prie de lire une fois en entier les instructions pour prendre 
connaissance du déroulement du jeu et procéder ensuite à la construction de la stratégie.  
Sur ce jeu, vous devez formuler une stratégie. Une stratégie est un plan complet 
d'actions. Si vous donnez par exemple votre stratégie à une autre personne, elle devrait 
être capable de faire exactement la même chose que vous auriez faite. 
Une stratégie doit être : complète (elle doit prévoir une action dans tous les cas 
possibles), pas ambiguë (elle doit prévoir un choix seulement pour une situation) et 
correcte de point de vue informationnel (les informations utilisées sont celles basées sur 
ce document). 
Exemple de stratégie incomplète: dans la première période je prévois un prix de 40. 
Dans les périodes suivantes ma prévision est 70 si le prix est plus grand que 50 et 40 si 
le prix est plus petit que 50. Cette stratégie est incomplète parce qu'elle ne prévoir rien 
si le prix est exactement à 50. 
Exemple de stratégie ambiguë: dans la première période ma prévision est de 70. Dans 
les périodes suivantes je vais augmenter ma prévision de 10 si ma prévision précédente 
était plus petite que le prix réalisé, je vais la baisser de 10 si ma prévision précédente 
était plus grande que le prix réalisé et je vais maintenir ma prévision si mon erreur de 
prévision dans la période précédente était plus petite que 5. 
Cette stratégie est ambiguë parce qu'il n'est pas clair quelle serait la prévision si la 
prévision précédente était par exemple de 3 points en dessous du prix réalisé : devrait la 
prévision être maintenue ou diminuée de 10? Quelle est la règle prioritaire? 
Exemple de stratégie incorrecte de point de vue informationnel: dans la première 
période ma prévision est 45. Dans les périodes suivantes, ma prévision dépend du prix 
réalisé en période 5. Si en période 5 le prix est plus grand que 50, j'augmente, sinon je 
baisse. Cette stratégie est incorrecte puisqu'elle ne dis pas comment on fait pour prédire 
entre la période 2 et la période 5. 
 
Description du marché: 
 
Chaque marché est compose de 6 participants. Au début du marché, 3 des participants 
ont une dotation de 6 biens X et de 200 points et 3 participants ont une dotation de 2 
biens X et de 600 points.  
 
Vous avez une dotation de 2 biens X et de 600 points.  
 
Le jeu dure 10 périodes.  
 
A chaque période, vous devez vendre ou acheter des unités du bien X. X peut être 
considéré comme un actif avec une vie de 10 périodes, et votre stock de X est reporté de 
période en période. A la fin de chaque période, chaque unité de X vous paie un   14  
dividende. Les dividendes sont soit de 0, soit de 20 points, avec une chance de 50% 
chacun. Donc, le dividende moyen par période est de 10.  
Vos profits sur le marché seront égaux au total des dividendes que vous recevez pour 
vos unités de X que vous avez en stock à la fin de chaque période, plus le cash que vous 
avez à la fin du marché.  
 
Vous pouvez utiliser le tableau 2 suivant pour prendre vos décisions. Il y a 5 colonnes 
dans ce tableau. La première colonne, qui porte le nom "nombre de périodes" vous 
rappelle la durée du marché.  La deuxième colonne, qui porte le nom "période 
courante", vous indique la période en cours. La troisième colonne donne le nombre de 
périodes pendant lesquelles vous détenez le stock à partir de la période courante incluse. 
La quatrième colonne vous donne la valeur moyenne du dividende pour chaque unité de 
X. La cinquième colonne vous donne l'espérance de dividende total pour le restant de la 
période pour chaque unité de X en stock : pour chaque unité de X en stock jusqu'à la fin 
du marché, vous avez une espérance de recevoir le montant listé en colonne 5. Les 
nombres listés en colonne 5 est obtenu en multipliant les nombres en colonne 3 et 4.   
  
Imaginez par exemple qu'il reste 4 périodes. Puisque le dividende payé pour une unité a 
une chance de 50% d'être 0 et 50% d'être 20, le dividende a une espérance de 10 par 
période pour chaque unité de X. Si par exemple vous avez une seule unité, le dividende 
total payé sur les 4 périodes restantes a une espérance de 4 ×10 = 40. 
 
L'activité sur le marché: 
 
Votre activité sur le marché consiste à vendre et à acheter des unités de X. Ainsi, à 
chaque période, vous devez prendre les décisions suivantes : 
-communiquer un prix auquel vous seriez prêt à vendre une unité de X  
-communiquer un prix auquel vous seriez prêt à acheter une unité de X  
-décider de vendre en fonction du prix qui est établi sur le marché (oui/non) 
-décider d'acheter en fonction du prix établi sur le marché. (oui/non) 



































1               
2               
3               
4               
5               
6               
7               
8               
9               
10               
Tableau 1 
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Le prix réel sur le marché (auquel se feront les transactions) dépendra effectivement de 
toutes les offres de vente et de toutes les offres d'achat dans votre groupe, et des 
décisions réelles d'achat ou vente.  
 
Comment calculer vos gains: 
 
Pour une période :  
 
GAIN POUR UNE PERIODE =  
DIVIDENDE PAR UNITE ×  NOMBRE D'UNITES EN STOCK A LA FIN DE CETTE 
PERIODE  
 - MONTANT DU PRIX PAYE POUR ACHETER UN X (si achat)  
+ MONTANT DU PRIX RECU POUR LA VENTE D'UN X (si vente)  
 
Gain total : 
 
GAIN TOTAL = GAIN PERIODE 1 + GAIN PERIODE 2 + GAIN PERIODE 3 + 
GAIN PERIODE 4 + GAIN PERIODE 5 + GAIN PERIODE 6 + GAIN PERIODE 7 + 
GAIN PERIODE 8+ GAIN PERIODE 9 + GAIN PERIODE 10 
 
Ending Period  Current Period  Number of 
 holding Periods      × 
Average 








10 1  10  10  100 
10 2  9  10  90 
10 3  8  10  80 
10 4  7  10  70 
10 5  6  10  60 
10 6  5  10  50 
10 7  4  10  40 
10 8  3  10  30 
10 9  2  10  20 
10 10  1  10 10 
Tableau 2 
 
Pendant les 4 premières périodes, le marché se déroule comme décrit et vous 
pouvez remplir le tableau jusqu'à la période 4 incluse.  
Vous devez aussi remplir le tableau pour le restant des périodes. A partir de la 
période 5, à la fin de chaque période, l'expérimentateur vous annonce 
publiquement que le prix établi sur votre marché pour une unité de X à cette 
période est trop haut de 5%  par rapport aux fondamentaux de l'économie.  
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